By Laura Gil
In a nuclear emergency, the communicator’s role is almost as crucial as that of the first responder. Providing clear, accurate information amid the alarm and dread that emergencies provoke — when every second counts — can save lives. So what have emergency communicators learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident?
“Our job as communicators is to help the public make informed decisions about their safety and the safety of their loved ones,” said Director of radiation information and outreach at the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), whose responsibilities include radiation monitoring, Jessica Wieder. “Radiation emergencies can be scary, so our impulse in the past has been to first calm public anxiety. Now our primary goal is to translate the seriousness of radiological events into informed preparation and action without causing undue panic.”
Am I safe?
Any situation involving radioactive materials leads to widespread fear, often because, for many, the concept of radiation is unfamiliar and hard to understand. To respond effectively in these situations, communicators must focus on answering a key question raised by those affected: am I safe?
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident made it clear that, to answer this question and reduce public anxiety, communicators need to provide the public with data in a clear format.
“People wanted data. They wanted numbers,” Wieder said. “During the Fukushima Daiichi accident, we learned the importance of getting out timely information. When that didn’t happen, we saw how quickly we lost trust and how hard it was to regain it.”
Before the Fukushima Daiichi accident, only a handful of people had access to EPA’s radiation data, which was password-protected. However, within the first two weeks of the accident, EPA removed the password protection measures and made the data available on its public website, where they have been ever since.
Within 24 hours of the accident, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) — the Japanese company operating the plant in Fukushima — was already providing preliminary radiation monitoring data and real-time updates on conditions at the reactor. It became a challenge, however, for citizens and the media to understand what this information actually meant.
Facts alone do not overcome strong emotions, Wieder added. “We cannot just give the public data; we have to give them data along with explanations, so that they can understand what these data mean in terms of their health.”
Since the accident, the IAEA has supported the Fukushima Prefecture in many areas by providing technical expertise and helping disseminate information to the public. It has helped produce relevant public information materials, including flyers and a website, that show the results of radiation monitoring and decontamination efforts. “Using pictures, infographics, clear explanations and language free of scientific jargon is key to achieving public understanding of the data and addressing perceived risks,” said Miklos Gaspar of the IAEA’s Office of Public Information and Communication and technical officer who oversees the information dissemination support to the Fukushima Prefecture.
Many voices, one message
Once built, credibility must be maintained. In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, communicators learned that, to maintain the public’s trust, authoritative voices in an emergency must use the same message with the same tone of voice. “If one organization says one thing, and one expert another, we’ve lost trust. We can’t afford that in emergencies,” Wieder said.
When various trusted sources send out the same data and the same messages to the public, it works. “Having somebody external echoing your message brings a level of additional reliability to the information you are putting out that you might not otherwise have by yourself,” said Head of Communications at Argentina’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, María Laura Duarte,. “Coordinating that in advance is critical.”
In Argentina, like in many other countries, Government representatives, responders and experts from academia have joined forces to work on emergency communication, forming networks, so that in the event of an emergency they know exactly who to call. Involving and briefing the media in advance in preparation for possible incidents, and including them in response exercises, is also useful, Duarte said.
A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes
In addition to building trust, coordinated and consistent messaging helps combat misinformation. Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, information shared by citizens was sometimes incorrect. “The perceived risk of radiation is very high,” Wieder said. “And that leads to misinformation.”
While it is next to impossible to respond to every rumour, communicators agree that the key is to focus on those that are most widespread, and to step in with several different partner organizations to root out inaccuracy.
“If you have to deal with misinformation, try to find a partner who is trusted, for example a doctor from a hospital, and let them clarify the situation to support your message,” said Senior Communications Advisor at the Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group (NRG), a company that operates a nuclear research reactor in the Netherlands, Cora Blankendaal.
Building trust, one day at a time
But building trust is not only important during emergencies.
“We have to communicate at all times, be it good or bad news,” Duarte said. Educating the population and communicating with them daily, in an open and transparent manner, will make them more prone to trusting the authorities’ messages — should an emergency occur. Social media has become an effective way to do this, since it allows communicators and the public to engage in two-way interactions and build a public dialogue, she said.
Earning public trust means “engaging representatives of the community in radiation measurement and communicating with the public continuously and transparently,” said Gaspar.
An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts today completed a nuclear security advisory mission in Niger, which was carried out at the request of its Government.
The scope of the two-week International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission included reviews of the legislative and regulatory framework for the security of radioactive material, regulatory practices (licensing, inspections and enforcement) and coordination between organizations and stakeholders involved in nuclear security. The mission also covered security of radioactive material, and associated facilities and activities to prevent malicious acts intended or likely to have harmful radiological consequences. The team reviewed the security systems and measures in place in facilities where uranium ore concentrates or radioactive sources are in use or in storage. In May 2009, Niger ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and its incorporation into the country’s nuclear security regime was also included in the scope of the mission.
The team observed that Niger has established a nuclear security regime with essential elements of the IAEA’s guidance on the fundamentals of nuclear security. The team offered recommendations and suggestions to support Niger in further enhancing and sustaining nuclear security. Good practices were identified that can serve as examples to other IAEA Member States to help strengthen their nuclear security activities.
“The IPPAS team compared Niger’s existing practices against the CPPNM and its 2005 amendment, as well as with IAEA nuclear security guidance,” said Head of Nuclear Security of Materials and Facilities Section of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security, Muhammad Khaliq after the closing of the mission. “This is the first IPPAS mission to Niger, which demonstrates strong commitment of the Government of Niger to enhancing nuclear security, both in the country and globally.”
“In this period characterized by the COVID-19 pandemic, Niger warmly welcomes the efforts made by the IAEA to respond favourably to its request for an IPPAS mission held in Niamey,” said Deputy Chief of Staff to the President of the Republic, Djibo Takoubakoye Daouda. “The results of this assessment will be taken into account during the upcoming revision of Niger’s Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan in order to strengthen nuclear security in Niger”.
The team was led by Senior Official for Nuclear Security Implementation at the Burkina Faso nuclear safety regulatory body (Autorité Nationale de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (ARSN)), Delwendé Nabayaogo and included five other experts from Cote d’Ívoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Romania and the IAEA. They met in the capital Niamey with officials from the Niger High Authority for Atomic Energy (Haute Autorité Nigérienne à l’Energie Atomique (HANEA)) and the Authority for Regulation and Nuclear Safety (Autorité de Régulation et de sûreté nucléaire (ARSN)), as well as with representatives of other relevant ministries and governmental organizations, including Civil Protection, National Police and Customs.
Background
The mission was the 91st IPPAS mission conducted by the IAEA since the programme began in 1995.
IPPAS missions are intended to assist States in strengthening their national nuclear security regime. The missions provide peer advice on implementing international instruments, along with IAEA guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities.
During missions, a team of international experts observes a nation’s system of physical protection, compares it with international good practices and makes recommendations for improvement. IPPAS missions are conducted both on a nationwide and facility-specific basis.
